



DESCRIPTIF ENSEIGNEMENT

INTITULE DU COURS :	Coercion and Engagement: The Politics of Rogue States
COURSE'S TITLE :	
ENSEIGNANT(S): Dr Virginie Grzelczyk	
FONCTION(S):	
TYPE DE COURS :	

RESUME DU COURS / OBJECTIFS

Despite increasing patterns of cooperation in areas such as trade, the environment or nuclear non-proliferation, the international community has always been faced with countries that were reluctant to "play by the rules." While some such as Iraq and Libya have or are well on their way to salvaging their relationship with the international community, others such as Iran and North Korea are still engaged in illegal activities and thus hold contentious relationships with many states. Does the world have a duty to engage such dangerous actors? What are the risks in developing diplomatic incentives with countries that are hard to trust? Can those states ever recover from having been rogues?

SYLLABUS / TARGETS

The purpose of this class is to examine the status of 'rogue', or 'difficult' states in the world, and to determine how the international community has been dealing with such states, how it can relate with them in order to achieve peaceful outcomes, and whether or not a new approach is needed.

First, we will attempt to draw the main characteristics of rogue states. Then, we will investigate potential policies on how to deal with such actors, and we will focus on a wide range of tactics from engagement through diplomacy and economic incentives to much less accommodating strategies such as coercion, pre-emptive strikes and regime change.

EVALUATION:

Students' mark for the module will be based on the submission, by the end of the last week of class, of a portfolio. The portfolio includes two types of assignments:

- (1) Literature review work which relates to the theoretical aspects and research about rogue states (50% of portfolio mark)
- (2) Project work which relates to the practical aspects of dealing with dangerous actors (50% of portfolio mark)

PLAN / SEANCES:

Session 1	Framing the Rogue State Concept
Session 2	Nature of the offense: from bad behaviour to outlaw
Session 3	Nature of ruling agents: from outlaw to sanctioned
Session 4	Nature of sanctions: from judged to prisoner
Session 5	A capital offense? Regime change as ultimate penalty
Session 6	Living as ex-convicts: is redemption from rogue-hood possible?

BIBLIOGRAPHIE:

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- Borer, Douglass and James Bowen. 2007. "Rethinking the Cuban Embargo: An Inductive Analysis." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 3 (127-143).
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- Crislip, Mark and Valerie A. Sulfaro. 1997. "How Americans Perceive Foreign Policy Threats: A Magnitude Scaling Analysis." *Political Psychology* 18 (1):103-126. doi: 10.1111/0162-895X.00047.
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- Downs, Chuck. 1999. Over The Line: North Korea's Negotiating Strategy. Washington D.C: AEI Press.
- Estelami, H. 1999. "A Study of Iran's Responses to US Economic Sanctions." *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 3 (3):52.
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